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How will the EU presidency
play out during Poland's
autumn parliamentary election?
On July 1 Poland took over the European Union (EU) rotating presidency for the first time. Since
the Lisbon treaty created a permanent President of the European Council, the role of the EU
presidency has become less important and largely administrative with little executive power
attached to it. Nonetheless, it does still entail framing the EU's agenda and chairing meetings of the
Council of Ministers so, for the next six months, Poland will host many of the Union's most
important events and receive visits from Europe's key political leaders.
However, the situation is complicated by the fact that a parliamentary election is scheduled to
take place in Poland on October 9, bang in the middle of the Polish presidency. These two processes
will, therefore, inevitably become entwined. Polish prime minister, and leader of the ruling
centre-right Civic Platform (Platform Obywatelska: PO) party, Donald Tusk will clearly try to use
the timing of the presidency to provide a European and global platform for his government, in order 
to boost his party's chances of winning the October election. As part of this, the Civic Platform-led
government will attempt to position Poland as a major European player and highlight the fact that it 
was the only EU state that did not go into recession following the onset of the global economic crisis.
This paper seeks to answer the question: how are the Polish EU presidency and autumn
parliamentary election likely to inter-act? It does so by examining how the issue of European
integration has played out in Polish domestic party and electoral politics in recent years. It focuses
on the two major Polish parties: Civic Platform and the right-wing Law and Justice (Prawo
i Sprawiedliwoœæ: PiS) party, the main parliamentary opposition grouping. These two parties have
dominated the Polish political scene for the last six years and are very likely to do so in the
forthcoming election.
Europe becomes a source of divisions
Prior to EU accession in May 2004 and in spite of frequent changes of government and party
political alignments, there were very high levels of agreement among the main political forces in
Poland over the broad direction and main objectives of foreign policy. Integration into Western
international structures was seen as a natural consequence of the transition process following the
collapse of communism and the pursuit of EU membership one of (if not the) over-riding goal.
However, there has been no such consensus in the post-accession period, particularly following
the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections, which saw a re-alignment of Polish domestic
party politics, including a significant shift to the right. Following the installation of a Law and
Justice-led government and the election of the party's candidate Lech Kaczyñski as President, the
elections also heralded a major discontinuity in the development of Poland's EU (and, more
broadly, foreign) policy; especially after July 2006 when Law and Justice party leader (and Lech's
twin brother) Jaros³aw Kaczyñski became prime minister.
Law and Justice promised to significantly re-orientate Polish foreign and European policy by
‘re-claiming' it from a post-1989 establishment that, it argued, had been over-conciliatory and
insufficiently robust in defending the country's interests within the EU. Although, in formal terms,
the Law and Justice-led government remained committed to European integration, it adopted
a tough rhetoric of defending Polish sovereignty and ‘national interests' and was frequently at odds
with Poland's EU allies, especially Germany, and European left-liberal cultural elites.
On the other hand, since it came to power after the autumn 2007 parliamentary election, the
current Civic Platform-led government has made a concerted effort to change the country's image
as a ‘trouble-maker' on European issues. It has also tried to make Poland's approach towards the EU 
more predictable and adopt a more conciliatory tone with Brussels and Poland's EU partners.
Although, throughout much of the preceding period, Civic Platform also often favoured adopting
a 'tough' negotiating stance with, the EU (its parliamentary caucus leader Jan Rokita, for example,
coined the slogan ‘Nice or Death' during the 2003-4 EU constitutional treaty negotiations) the party
always valued its trans-national links with the mainstream (often strongly federalist) European
centre-right, particularly the German Christian Democrats (CDU). Finding itself in opposition to the 
Law and Justice governments, from 2005 onwards Mr Tusk's party started to adopt a more
unambiguously pro-EU tone; indeed, some commentators suggested that Civic Platform's 2007
election victory represented Poland's ‘second return to Europe'.
Agreement over objectives
However, in spite of the fact that Europe (and foreign policy more generally) has become more
contested and politicised in recent years, there is still very broad agreement between the two main
parties on the overall objectives of Polish EU policy. These have cut across domestic political
divisions such as Civic Platform's apparently more liberal socio-economic policies compared to the
Law and Justice more ‘solidaristic' programme. Broadly speaking, this also applies, to Poland's
main priorities for the EU presidency.
For example, both Civic Platform and the Law and Justice (and, indeed, all the main Polish
parties) support the notion of EU ‘solidarity', that is: a large EU budget involving substantial
regional aid and fiscal transfers from richer to poorer states; even though Mr Tusk's party
supposedly favours more economically liberal domestic policies. Similarly, both parties support
liberalising the EU internal market, encouraging free movement of labour and more open and
flexible labour markets, and oppose moves to harmonise taxes and increase EU social regulation;
even though Law and Justice claims to favour more ‘solidaristic' domestic socio-economic policies.
Both parties also support: active EU engagement with East European post-Soviet states in order to
the draw them more closely into the West's orbit, with the eventual prospect of EU accession for the
most ‘advanced' countries such as Ukraine; and the development of common EU policies aimed at
securing external energy security.
Moreover, at a more philosophical level, the two main parties have not really competed over
different visions of the EU's future trajectory and the nature of Poland's participation in the
European project. For sure, in rhetorical terms at least, Law and Justice has always had a broad
ideological commitment to more ‘Gaullist' inter-governmental approaches to European integration. 
However, in practice its support for a large EU budget and fiscal transfers, further liberalisation and
opening up of EU markets, the development of common foreign and energy policies, and further
EU enlargement have often driven the party towards supporting the ‘community method' and
supranational institutions like the European Commission that share these priorities. In other words, 
Law and Justice's ‘ideological' preference for inter-governmentalism has often given way
in practice to a more federalist and integrationist approach.
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Clashes likely over strategy, competence and political styles
The issue of Poland-EU relations has, therefore, become more contested in recent years. It is also
likely to be a controversial question in the forthcoming parliamentary election, particularly given
the timing of the EU presidency. However, Civic Platform and Law and Justice have, nonetheless,
agreed on the broad objectives of EU policy and even, in practice and spite of the rhetorical
differences, their broad approaches to how the European integration project should proceed.
So what have they disagreed about? And how is the EU presidency (and European issue more
generally) likely to play out during the autumn parliamentary election campaign?
Firstly, the two main parties have disagreed over what are the best strategy and tactics to achieve 
Poland's EU objectives. The Civic Platform government, for example, has favoured a fairly
minimalist and consensual approach based on making long-term progress through building
support for small, incremental steps forward. The best example of this is perhaps the Eastern
Partnership programme: a fairly modest Polish-Swedish initiative aimed at strengthening EU ties
and regional co-operation with its post-Soviet neighbours that was consulted extensively with other 
EU states before its launch. Law and Justice, on the other hand, has favoured a more assertive
maximalist approach of staking out territory by ‘going it alone' and challenging other countries to
respond to Poland's agenda; exemplified by, for example, the tough tactics that that it employed
during the 2007 Lisbon treaty negotiations when it threatened a veto in order to block the
introduction of a proposed new, population-based voting system in the Council of Ministers.
Secondly, the two parties have treated Europe as a so-called ‘valence issue': one where they
argue about who is most competent to pursue a shared objective – in this case, effectively
representing and advancing Polish ‘national interests' within the EU. The Civic Platform
government has, the party's supporters argue, adopted a positive and constructive approach,
especially with Warsaw's main EU allies and thereby tried to locate Poland within the so-called
‘European mainstream' and position the country as a reliable and stable EU member state. This,
they argue, stands in favourable contrast to the 2005-7 period of Law and Justice-led governments
when Poland became isolated by creating an impression that it was an unpredictable negotiating
partner unable to forge stable long-term alliances. 
Law and Justice supporters, on the other hand, argue that identifying Poland with the ‘European
mainstream' was nothing to boast about: any government that agreed to everything that Brussels
and the main EU states proposed would inevitably win plaudits for its ‘constructive' approach but,
like the Civic Platform government, have little concrete to show for it. While the Law and Justice-led 
governments' approach may have annoyed Brussels and EU member states like Germany, this was,
the party's supporters argue, an inevitable price to be paid for standing up robustly in defence of
Poland's national interests and, they claim, proved a more effective means of extracting
concessions.
Thirdly, differences between the two main parties over approaches to Europe are also a question
of different political styles and self-images, and the images that they attempt to portray of their
political opponents. On the one hand, Civic Platform tries to present its European policy within the
context of its broader self-image as a pro-Western modernising force – a non-ideological, pragmatic, 
common-sense party of ‘progress by small steps' – compared with Law and Justice which, it argues,
represents backward, provincial nationalism. For example, Mr Tusk tried to frame the 2007
parliamentary election as a ‘civilisational choice' between the backward authoritarian East and
modern democratic West.
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Law and Justice, on the other hand, tries to locate the party's approach to European integration
as part of its self-image as a patriotic party determined to stand up to the major EU states (especially
Germany) in order to advance Polish national interests. The party also presents itself as a staunch
defender of Polish cultural identity and Catholic religious values – and one that is prepared to clash
with the West European left-liberal political and media establishment and cultural elites in order to
ensure that the EU respects these traditional values.
The ‘domestication' of the European issue
In other words, Polish party divisions over Europe have been largely subsumed within broader
political debates between Civic Platform and Law and Justice and assimilated into the over-arching
logics of domestic party politics. No doubt they will once again be folded into domestic politics
during the Polish EU presidency and autumn parliamentary election campaign. 
For Law and Justice supporters, the party's more assertive approach to Europe (and foreign
affairs more generally) exemplifies a more wide ranging break with the policies pursued by the
post-1989 Polish political elites. The Tusk government's attempts to locate Warsaw within the
‘European mainstream' are thus dismissed as part of a broader submissive approach to European
policy and international relations that typifies the Polish political and foreign policy establishment. 
For supporters of the current government, its more consensual and pragmatic approach to
foreign and European policy is seen as part of Civic Platform's broader appeal as a modernising,
non-ideological, non-confrontational party whose approach is based on building alliances and
moving forward incrementally through ‘small steps'. The Law and Justice opposition's approach to
Polish-EU relations, on the other hand, is felt to exemplify its more general incompetence and
confrontational style of politics. 
So Polish domestic party politics has not really been ‘Europeanised', as some commentators
argued that it might increasingly be following EU accession. Rather, discussion of the European
issue during the EU presidency and in the run up to the parliamentary election will, once again,
demonstrate how the opposite is actually the case: that Polish party debates about European
integration have been ‘domesticated'. ‘Europe' and the EU presidency will, therefore, be salient
issues of (often passionate) party debate in the forthcoming parliamentary election. But these party
debates will essentially be about domestic politics rather than clashes over different objectives of
Polish European policy or ideological visions of the European integration project.
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